Gavin Newsom tells CNN’s Jake Tapper he won’t run for president if Kamala Harris runs in 2028

The Dems need to be out making themselves know already. I cant think of a single one who is popular enough to get majority votes. Elections have changed with social media.<br><br>The young voters are not enough and the older voters and going to pick politicians they are used to seeing while Trump has done damage to the Republicans people like Rubio will still gather a lot of votes because he is established, even if he has sold his soul to Trump

On a side note- how TF do some faqqets who clearly don&#39;t fish ever, think making a shitty looking fishing ad. Is going to make people believe the BS they just saw is factual and a norm day for them??? Because unless it&#39;s stealing tax dollars, newscum doesn&#39;t have any other daily activities.....

LMFAO a man known for fraud, corruption, homelessness, drug problems, sending money directly to his wife&#39;s ngo, the list goes on.... <a href="http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=%23cnn">#cnn</a> he should have been interviewed as his last statement before his public execution for treason against the country and breaking the oath he took!!! 🖕🖕🖕🖕😉😉🫡🫡🇺🇲🇺🇲🇺🇲🇺🇲

Political Number 1 <br>Political Analyst<br>Ammar Abdulaziz Hamid Saif Al-Mikhlafi<br>September 11, 2026<br><br>Al-Mukha: Did Tariq Lose It, or Did He Redraw the Battle?<br><br>In my previous post, &quot;Tariq Saleh and the War of Attrition: Reshaping His Position in the Yemeni Equation,&quot; I posited that the aim of the attrition campaign against Tariq might not be his outright defeat, but rather the weakening of his capacity to remain an independent military and political actor.<br><br>Recent events in Al-Mukha lend greater weight to this possibility.<br><br>First:<br>I do not believe the accusation that Tariq Saleh deliberately surrendered Al-Mukha and Bab al-Mandab holds water so easily. Forces from the Giants Brigades, the Nation&#39;s Shield, and the Fourth Military Region—under the command of Hamdi Shukri—fought alongside his troops. Consequently, responsibility for what occurred cannot be pinned on a single party; rather, it reveals a broader crisis regarding leadership, coordination, and the multiplicity of decision-making centers.<br><br>Second:<br>The question is not merely why Tariq withdrew, but rather: Was the withdrawal the result of military collapse and poor coordination, or was it a calculated decision to redistribute forces and avoid their depletion?<br><br>If it was a calculated move, Tariq may have realized that turning Al-Mukha into an open-ended war of attrition would cost him both his forces and his project. He likely concluded that preserving and repositioning his strength was more important than defending a city that could be retaken later.<br><br>Third:<br>Here, a more complex possibility emerges: Was Tariq’s withdrawal from Al-Mukha the start of a strategic repositioning toward the south—coordinated with southern forces led by Hamdi Shukri and aligned with a presidential directive that enjoys regional understanding, particularly from Saudi Arabia? This move is not necessarily aimed at secession or partition; rather, it seeks to prevent the depletion of forces and to redistribute them within the southern equation. The goal is to maintain a military and political balance that could forestall any party from imposing a partition between the North and the South.<br><br>Fourth:<br>There may be an understanding based on mutual interests between Tariq and certain southern forces—not a formal alliance, but a convergence of interests that prevents any single force from monopolizing control over Mocha, while simultaneously limiting the ability of forces affiliated with Islah in Taiz to capitalize on this strategic location.<br><br>This does not imply the existence of a secret agreement, but rather a likely alignment of interests among competing parties.<br><br>Fifth:<br>Mocha is more than just a battlefront. Having long suffered from marginalization, it has begun to regain its economic and strategic importance, transforming—with Emirati support—into a significant military and economic hub.<br><br>Consequently, turning it into a theater of attrition would mean destroying a city, a port, and assets that could have served as a driver of progress for the people of Taiz and Yemen.<br><br>Sixth:<br>The arrival of Ansar Allah in Mocha alters the equation; its proximity to the Bab al-Mandab Strait grants them greater leverage regarding the Red Sea and international shipping, meaning the issue is no longer purely Yemeni.<br><br>This is where the regional factor comes more clearly into play: Saudi Arabia is rebuilding its defense architecture in cooperation with Turkey and Pakistan, and Turkey is expanding its presence and influence in the region, while Israel monitors shifts in the balance of power near the Red Sea and Syria—particularly given the growing Turkish presence.<br><br>Thus, Mocha becomes part of a broader struggle for influence, control over maritime corridors, and the balance of power, rather than merely a battle between Tariq and Ansar Allah. Seventh:<br>The absence of a direct regional response commensurate with the strategic importance of Mocha—following recent Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia that injured approximately 73 people and damaged vital facilities—raises the question of whether the region is entering a new phase where regional powers assume responsibility for their own security, independent of direct American intervention. Pakistan had clarified at the time that discussions regarding a military response under the defense agreement had not yet begun.